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Existing on-chain trading forces every user to act like their own solver. You choose the route, the pool, the slippage tolerance, and the execution strategy — all before the market has competed to give you a better outcome.

Three structural gaps

The Sui ecosystem already supports active AMM, order-book, and aggregator-based trading. But these systems execute orders largely in isolation, and three gaps remain unresolved.

Platform gap

CoW Protocol pioneered the Coincidence-of-Wants (CoW) model on Ethereum — batching opposing intents and settling matched portions peer-to-peer to avoid AMM price impact. Since 2021 it has returned over $1.2B in surplus to traders on cumulative volume exceeding $199.5B. Yet no major CoW-style protocol exists on Sui, leaving its DeFi ecosystem without a native batch-auction coordination layer. Sui’s object-centric storage, low fees, and sub-second finality make it viable where Ethereum’s gas costs forced the auction off-chain.

Trust gap

Existing CoW implementations delegate winner selection, price verification, and solver coordination to off-chain services. This introduces two problems: liveness depends on trusted infrastructure, and the solver set is governed by a DAO-curated allow-list. The protocol cannot verify that the winner was chosen fairly — participants must trust the off-chain operator.

Liquidity coordination gap

Sui DEXs process orders individually. Cetus executes one AMM swap per transaction, DeepBook matches one taker against available maker quotes, and aggregators still route through the same fragmented sources. When two users hold compatible opposing intents in the same market window, those intents are executed independently through separate liquidity paths, paying double the price impact and fees. The potential zero-slippage match is missed.

The cost of fragmented execution

ProblemRoot cause
AMM price impactConstant-product formula moves price proportionally to trade size relative to pool depth
Fragmented liquidityTraders manually search across pools and aggregators
MEV exposurePublic transactions are vulnerable to frontrunning and sandwich attacks
Weak user protectionA badly chosen minimum output or slippage setting leaves money on the table
Permissioned solver setWhitelists limit competition and increase centralization risk
No atomic settlementMulti-step settlement on EVM requires off-chain coordination; partial failures are possible

The intent-based alternative

Reiy flips this model: users describe the outcome they want, not the path to get there. Instead of routing through fragmented liquidity, the protocol collects intents into batches, lets permissionless solvers compete to fill them, and enforces settlement safety entirely on-chain. The How Reiy Works page explains the full architecture — intents, epoch-gated batch auctions, solver competition, and on-chain settlement enforcement.